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ABSTRACT
What is the guiding rationale according to which the rules of
international jurisdiction to adjudicate private disputes are to be con-
strued? Israeli law has been contemplating this question for some time
now, as the traditional territorial theory seems to be on the decline
and is therefore unsatisfactory as a basis for modern legal rules. Un-
fortunately, a thorough effort to choose an alternative theory is still
missing. A painful reminder of this current state of affairs was given
recently as the Israeli Supreme Court issued, on the very same day,
two decisions concerning cases in which a foreign plaintiff, having no
other effective forum in which to litigate his dispute with the defen-
dant, sought relief from Israeli courts. Israeli law, unlike American
law, grants plaintiffs a constitutional right of access to court, and does
not purport to protect with the same zeal the defendant's interest not
to be haled to a foreign forum. Still, while in one case the Court ac-
knowledged its jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim, it declared the ab-
sence of such jurisdiction with regard to the second case. The second
case involved a claim filed by a Monaco resident and citizen whose
husband, sharing the same residency and citizenship, had been evad-
ing litigation with her on the issue of the get - the Jewish religious
divorce. A careful comparison of these two decisions arguably reveals a
possible contradiction (the argument being that each decision followed
a different theory of international jurisdiction) and a possible error
(the argument being that the decision in the get case, which, in fact,
may influence many Jewish women worldwide, did not follow the cor-
rect theory of international jurisdiction). The purpose of the article is
* Assistant Professor, Ramat-Gan Law School.
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therefore twofold: first, to depict the current disarray in this area of
Israeli private international law, and the problems generated as a re-
sult; and second, to outline the contours of a new theory of interna-
tional jurisdiction, which seems to be having a growing influence over
Israeli case law, as the rationale generating it is driven by strong judi-
cial intuition. Private international law pertains to a wide range of
private disputes, and the arguments are thus demonstrated both in a
commercial context and in the context of marital and inheritance
disputes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Not very often does one encounter two conflicting judgments,
both rendered on the very same day by the very same court. However,
on Monday, November 29, 2004, the Israeli Supreme Court rendered
two judgments, the careful reading and meticulous comparison of
which demonstrate the lack of coherence in Israeli law regarding the
international jurisdiction of Israeli courts to adjudicate private dis-
putes (hereinafter "international jurisdiction"). The two judgments
rendered on that November morning were not directly related to one
another, except for the fact that both can be characterized as concern-
ing cases in which a foreign plaintiff, having no other effective forum
in which to file the claim against the defendant, attempted to obtain
relief from an Israeli court. One of the two judgments concerned a
claim filed by an American estate executor against a third party, who
was served with process in Israel and who allegedly withdrew money
unlawfully from the estate.1 The second judgment concerned a divorce
and maintenance claim filed by a Monaco citizen and resident whose
husband, also a Monaco citizen and resident, had refused for some
time to provide her with a get, the Jewish religious divorce that can
only be granted willingly by the husband.2
Critically examining both judgments from a purposeful view-
point-one that explores the rationale from which the legal rule de-
rives-reveals that the two judgments are in fact inseparable. The two
judgments may be actually contradicting one another. Inasmuch as
there is no clear and definitive statement by the Court explaining its
rationale, one may have reasons to conclude that each judgment was
rendered in accordance with a different theory of international juris-
diction. If this is true, the outcome of at least one of these two judg-
ments should have been quite different, assuming that the Court
should have adhered to one theory.
Thus, the Israeli law of international jurisdiction suffers from
some amount of incoherence. This incoherence is not the only feature
1 CA 2846/03 Eldermann v. Eherlich [2004] IsrSC 59(3) 529.
2 HCJ 6751/04 Sabbag v. The Rabbinical Court of Appeals [20041 IsrSC 59(4) 817.
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characterizing Israeli law. In recent years, a new theory of interna-
tional jurisdiction seems to be increasingly influential over Israeli case
law. This theory, the Just and Efficient Resolution of Disputes Theory
(JERDT), is of a functional nature, as it focuses upon resolving what it
considers to be no more than a private dispute, albeit one that gener-
ates factual connections to more than one country. The new theory at-
tempts to maximize the protection accorded to two interests: the
plaintiffs right of access to court, which is a constitutional right under
Israeli law, and the optimization of the venue in which the dispute is
to be adjudicated. This article will discuss several trends in Israeli
case law that support the JERDT theory.
Unfortunately, this new theory has also fallen victim to the
theoretical void created in the Israeli law of international jurisdiction.
Accordingly, even without taking a stand on which theory of interna-
tional jurisdiction is the "correct" one, the inexorable conclusion to be
drawn is that Israeli private international law is in immediate need of
a systematic theoretical inquiry. Of course, an orderly investigation
should eventually point to one theory upon which rules of interna-
tional jurisdiction ought to be crafted.
Part I of this article will introduce three alternative theories of
international jurisdiction that compete for dominance in Israeli pri-
vate international law. Two of these theories, the Principle of Territo-
rial Sovereignty and the Principle of Effectiveness, have been
acknowledged by Israeli law and have served courts in the process of
deriving the legal rules of international jurisdiction, at least rhetori-
cally. The third theory, the JERDT, has not yet been formally recog-
nized yet by Israeli lawmakers. In recent years, however, the JERDT
has begun influencing judicial decisions, gradually pushing aside its
two predecessors. Part II of this article will demonstrate the influence
of JERDT in the context of Section 482(a) of the Israeli Civil Procedure
Regulations.3 This section relates to the assumption of international
jurisdiction in a situation in which the foreign defendant is absent
from Israeli territory, but a business "agent" of that defendant can
nevertheless be served with process in Israel. Part III of this article
will demonstrate the influence of the JERDT in the context of jurisdic-
tion over claims filed by foreign plaintiffs in an attempt to obtain relief
from Israeli courts. The cases that will be discussed are unique in that
the plaintiffs have no other effective forum in which to litigate their
dispute with the defendant.
3 Israeli Civil Procedure Regulations 482(a) (1984) [hereinafter "Regulation
482(a)].
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II. THREE THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
What is the theoretical basis under Israeli law for the various
legal rules concerning the exercise of international jurisdiction? Is-
raeli case law has thus far acknowledged two different theories, but
has not explained the precise hierarchy between them.
One theory is the well known Principle of Territorial Sover-
eignty. This theory endeavors to exercise international jurisdiction
based on geographical criteria. The theory's contention is that a court
of law, like any other governmental agency, is entitled to exercise its
powers over persons and assets found within the Israeli territory and
over acts committed within the Israeli territory. Accordingly, the
court lacks any powers over persons and assets that are absent from
Israeli territory or over acts that were not concluded within the Israeli
territory.4 Some form of a territorial nexus between the forum and the
claim, or the parties to the claim, needs to exist so that a local court
would be considered competent to adjudicate the claim.
Notwithstanding its philosophical origins, the Principle of Ter-
ritorial Sovereignty accomplishes two goals. The first goal is "verti-
cal," as the theory enhances the ability of citizens to ascertain the
jurisdiction to which they are subject. For example, a person traveling
from Tel Aviv to Paris knows that her presence on French soil may
very well subject her to the jurisdiction of French courts. The second
goal is "horizontal" in nature, as the Principle of Territorial Sover-
eignty enhances the ability of countries to coordinate the division of
jurisdictional powers between them, even unilaterally and without di-
rect communication. If each country would adhere to the Principle of
Territorial Sovereignty, then division of such powers would be easily
accomplished in accordance with the easily acknowledged geographi-
cal criterion.
Because all rules of private international law are enacted uni-
laterally by each country, the Israeli legislature is entitled to reject the
Principle of Territorial Sovereignty and confer upon its courts extra-
territorial jurisdiction, provided that the legislature makes its inten-
tion clear.5 Otherwise, the default scope of jurisdiction dictated by the
Principle of Territorial Sovereignty covers only the Israeli territory.
Obviously, in a world in which many disputes between private parties
transpire as a result of activities that take place in a virtual sphere,
such as Internet-based activities, the Principle of Territorial Sover-
eignty cannot always be a good basis for determining which rules of
jurisdiction are to be interpreted. For example, how would the court
4 HCJ 279/51 Amsterdam v. Minister of Finance [1952] IsrSC 6 945. The case
embracing this doctrine in the American context is Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877).
5 See Amsterdam, IsrSC 6 at 971.
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  318 2008
2008]RESOLUTION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 319
decide whether or not it entertains jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim
filed because of a tort committed online, if the court's jurisdiction de-
pends upon the tort being committed within Israel?6 Indeed, the new
and globalized world in which we live may very well form a serious
challenge to accomplishing both the "vertical" and "horizontal" goals.
A second theory of international jurisdiction is the Principle of
Effectiveness. This theory seeks to limit the forum's international ju-
risdiction to cases in which a judgment that would eventually be ren-
dered by the local court would also actually be enforced.7 In its
original form, this theory was based on the implicit assumption that
judgments rendered by a local court can only be enforced by that court
or other courts of the same country.' However, the Principle of Effec-
tiveness has recently taken a slightly different form, as it is well estab-
lished that judgments of a local court, such as an Israeli court, can
actually be enforced abroad, in the United States, for example.9 Thus,
the Principle of Effectiveness can be restated to mandate the exercise
of international jurisdiction based on the probability that the judg-
ment rendered at the end of the adjudication process would in fact be
enforced.10
The Theory of Effectiveness is motivated by the following ratio-
nales. First, an overloaded court should not bother to adjudicate cases
if its judicial effort is to be futile because the judgment will not be
enforced." Second, the court should refrain from adjudicating cases in
circumstances that might disgrace the court or undermine the public
trust in the justice system. Such conditions could form if judgments
rendered by courts will not always be enforced.
The inherent difficulty in using the Principle of Effectiveness
as a theory of international jurisdiction is that the court is required to
immediately reject a claim for lack of international jurisdiction based
on an assessment of probability as to the future chances of enforcing
the judgment, even though this probabilistic assessment itself is quite
6 See generally Section 500(7) of the Israeli Civil Procedure Regulations, 1984,
which enables the court to exercise international jurisdiction on a foreign defen-
dant provided that the proceeding against the defendant is founded on "an act or
ommission committed within [Israel]".
7 See Amsterdam, IsrSC 6 at 971.
8 See MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE 70
(2004). Again, the case embracing this doctrine in the American context is Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ("The State, having within her territory property
of a non-resident, may hold and appropriate it to satisfy the claims of her citizens
against him; and her tribunals may inquire into his obligations to the extent nec-
essary to control the disposition of that property.").
9 KARAYANNI, supra note 8, at 89-90.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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variable. Indeed, the chances of enforcing any particular judgment de-
pend upon the physical existence of the defendant or his property at
the time of enforcement in a territory that enforces the court's judg-
ments. However, persons and assets can easily move or be transferred
from one place to another, especially in the modern world. Thus, the
probability of enforcement can certainly change instantaneously if the
defendant or his assets are on the move.
The basic rule under Israeli law regarding the assumption of
international jurisdiction is often referred to as the "Rule of Presence"
because it allows Israeli courts to entertain a claim if the defendant
was served with process within Israel.12 This rule derives from the
Principle of Territorial Sovereignty. The Rule of Presence mandates
that the territorial connection is the defendant's presence at the time
the claim is filed.13 Indeed, most Israeli rules of international jurisdic-
tion seem to be founded upon the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty
rather than upon the Principle of Effectiveness. The latter principle
usually serves only as one inconclusive consideration in certain bor-
derline cases.1 4
However, Israeli law of international jurisdiction has been ex-
periencing a theoretical transformation. The Principle of Territorial
Sovereignty is gradually being pushed away by social engineers in va-
rious countries.1 5 In Israel, it is being replaced by a new theory. This
new theory, which is driven primarily by strong judicial intuition, does
not view the process of exercising international jurisdiction as a decla-
ration made by an Israeli governmental agency that concerns the sov-
ereignty of one country or another. Rather, it views this process as a
functional move designed to promote the resolution of a dispute that,
although international in nature, is merely a private civil dispute. In-
deed, it is well acknowledged that the primary function of a court of
law in the private sphere, albeit not its only purpose,16 is to resolve the
12 CA 420/63 Abramovsky v. Gleitman [19631 IsrSC 17 2605. This rule is also
referred to sometimes as "the rule of capture," as it enables the capture of the
defendant for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction. In the United States, this rule
is called the Transient Jurisdiction Rule. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of
California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
13 See Abramovsky, IsrSC 17 at 2607.
14 See KARAYANNI, supra note 8, at 204-05 (stating that effectiveness should work
in a relative manner).
15 Id. at 78, 107 (describing how fairness considerations have influenced rules of
international jurisdiction); id. at 109-24 (describing the demise of the territorial
theory); see also Zheng Tang, Exclusive Choice of Forum Clauses and Consumer
Contracts in E-Commerce, 1 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 237 (2005).
16 See generally Development, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARv. L. REV.
1752 (2000).
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disputes brought before the court.17 In other words, the main goal of a
court of law with regard to private disputes is to provide the litigants
with a service of dispute resolution. This function of the court does not
change even if the dispute in question originates in the inter-sphere,' 8
generating factual connections to more than one country. 9 Thus, in-
stead of focusing on the international relations of sovereign countries,
the new theory shifts the focus to resolving the private dispute in the
"best" possible manner. In recent years, many Israeli judges have fol-
lowed the rationale of the new theory, even if not explicitly, when
called upon to decide questions of international jurisdiction.
In the Israeli context, the objective of resolving an interna-
tional dispute in the "best" possible manner is translated into more
concrete goals. Thus, the JERDT aspires to accomplish two goals in
the Israeli context. The first goal is to protect the plaintiffs right of
access to court. In contrast to U.S. law, which considers the right of
due process a constitutional right,2 ° Israeli law does not allow defend-
ants to enjoy a similar constitutional right.2 Rather, under Israeli
jurisprudence, it is the plaintiff who enjoys a constitutional protection
of her right of access to the court system.2 2 Since the new theory of
international jurisdiction aspires to bring about the resolution of a pri-
vate dispute within the confines of a regime under which the right of
access to court is a constitutional right, the new theory seems to be
aiming to protect the plaintiffs right to litigate a private dispute to
which she is a party before a court of law, and consequently to exhaust
her rights vis-A-vis the defendant. Thus, the new theory endeavors to
17 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984).
18 The "intersphere" means "the international sphere." The intersphere can be
either physical or virtual. It is the environment in which legal relationships are
formed and legal disputes erupt.
19 This is an apolitical perception of the judicial process. See Ralf Michaels, Two
Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1047-48 (2006) (describing
prevalent perception under EC law).
20 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding
that a state court may constitutionally assert long-arm jurisdiction over a party to
a dispute only if that party has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice").
21 The defendant may have a recognizable interest not to be haled into a foreign
forum, but such an interest does not amount to the level of a constitutional right.
Thus, the defendant's interest may be taken into account, for example, whenever
the court is conferred with discretion to decide whether or not to exercise its al-
ready existing jurisdiction. One such context is that of the Forum Non Conveniens
doctrine. See KARAYANNI, supra note 8, at 67.
22 See, e.g., PCA 3899/04 State of Israel v. Eben Zohar [2006] IsrSC -(26) (publi-
cation pending).
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adjust the Israeli law of international jurisdiction to fit the Israeli con-
stitutional regime.
The second goal that the new theory promotes is optimization
of the place in which the dispute is to be adjudicated. The significance
of this goal is apparent, as one can hardly question the importance of
attempting to litigate a private dispute, particularly an "international"
private dispute, before the best possible forum.23 To the extent that
the forum exercises its jurisdiction under the constraint of locating the
best possible place in which the dispute may be adjudicated, several
goals are accomplished. First, resources spent by the parties and wit-
nesses are spared. Second, the court may become better acquainted
with all relevant evidence in order to reach a just and truthful deci-
sion. Third, workload may be divided between legal systems. Finally,
protection is also provided for the defendant's interest not to be haled
to participate in a foreign judicial proceeding conducted away from his
home.2 4
This theory is referred to as the Just and Efficient Resolution
of Disputes because the 'Just' element stands for protecting the plain-
tiffs right of access to court and the 'efficient' element stands for pro-
moting the optimization of the place in which the dispute is to be
adjudicated. Maximizing the protection of these two interests
manifests a clear tendency to refrain from any arrangement that re-
quires balancing these interests against one another. Thus, the new
theory comports to the long-standing Israeli legal tradition of exercis-
ing international jurisdiction following a two-tiered test. The Israeli
two-tiered test differentiates between the court's "ability" to exercise
international jurisdiction and the "necessity" of exercising such juris-
diction.2 5 Current Israeli law accepts a situation in which the court is
empowered to exercise international jurisdiction and adjudicate a dis-
pute, but nevertheless chooses not to do so for various reasons, such as
the existence of a prior agreement on jurisdiction executed between
23 See KARAYANNI, supra note 8, at 98-99, 107; Paul Schiff Berman, The Globaliza-
tion of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 311, 314-15 (2002); Michael J. Whincop,
Three Positive Theories of International Jurisdiction, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 379,
392-94 (2000).
24 Unlike the right of access to court, which is a constitutional right under Israeli
law, the normative standing of the defendant's interest is unclear. In this respect,
Israeli law differs from U.S. law, which includes the defendant's interest within
the constitutional right of due process.
25 Thus, a defendant may raise a forum non conveniens argument even if jurisdic-
tion is established under Regulation 482(a). See, e.g., CA 2846/03 Eldermann v.
Eherlich [2004] IsrSC 59(3) 529, 533 (holding that, even though the defendant was
subjected to the jurisdiction of Israeli courts under Regulation 482(a), he was still
permitted to raise a forum-non-conveniens argument).
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the litigating parties.2 6 The JERDT changes the two-tiered test in a
manner that maximizes the protection accorded to the two rationales
comprising the JERDT without creating a conflict between these two
interests and without having to strike a balance between them. When
examining the "ability" of an Israeli court to exercise international ju-
risdiction, a court applying the JERDT should aspire to protect the
plaintiffs right of access to court. Thus, the court should, to the extent
possible, adhere to an interpretation that aspires to prevent a situa-
tion in which the plaintiff is left without any effective forum in which
to litigate his dispute with the defendant. On the other hand, when
examining the "necessity" of exercising international jurisdiction, a
court applying the JERDT should aspire to protect the process of opti-
mizing the place of adjudication of the dispute. Thus, for example, the
court should refrain from exercising its international jurisdiction if
from the defendant's viewpoint, the local forum is the worst of two pos-
sible places in which the dispute can be effectively litigated.
III. THE CASE OF SERVING PROCESS TO THE AGENT OF A FOREIGN
DEFENDANT
The JERDT is gradually taking over the Israeli case law of in-
ternational jurisdiction, thus pushing away its two theoretical prede-
cessors, the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty and the Principle of
Effectiveness. Proof for this argument can be found in the Israeli case
law interpreting Regulation 482(a). Regulation 482(a), the heading of
which is "Serving with Process to an Agent Authorized to conduct Bus-
iness," states that a claim filed regarding the business or work of a
person who is absent from Israel can be served with process to an
agent of that person currently operating or managing the defendant's
business in Israel. Of course, service of process to an agent is intended
to comport with the Rule of Presence described earlier.2 7 Regulation
482(a) is essentially an application of the Rule of Presence that focuses
the Israeli forum's "ability" to assume jurisdiction, the first step in the
two-tiered test.28
In two often-cited cases the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that,
"to the extent that the facts reveal more and more indications of a bus-
iness cooperation between the defendant and her 'agent', the court
26 Id.
27 Service of process to an agent allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over the
principal, but not over the agent.
28 In practice, the second tier, which concerns the "necessity" of exercising inter-
national jurisdiction, becomes relevant to the extent that the served defendant
raises a forum non conveniens argument or Lis Alibi Pendens argument or argues
that a jurisdiction agreement, within a jurisdiction other than Israel, was con-
cluded between the parties.
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shall tend to regard the latter as being an agent authorized to conduct
business" in the manner required by Regulation 482(a), thus enabling
the court to exercise international jurisdiction over the defendant.2 9
When applied properly, this test reflects the idea that exercising inter-
national jurisdiction over the absent defendant by serving process to
an agent in Israel derives from the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty.
Indeed, to the extent that many indications exist of business coopera-
tion between the defendant and his agent, the absent defendant can
certainly be regarded as being present within the Israeli territory. To
be sure, the more indications found of a business cooperation between
the defendant and her agent,3 ° the more one can argue that although
the defendant is technically, or physically, absent from Israel, "one of
her limbs," the agent, is actually present within the Israeli territory
and can be served with process, thus enabling the court to exercise
international jurisdiction over the defendant. Therefore, according to
the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty, the business cooperation be-
tween the defendant and her alleged agent should surely amount to
running a single economic unit or a single firm. Otherwise, one cannot
argue that the defendant herself is present in Israel.
However, the Israeli Supreme Court in the cases of General
Electric Corp. and Tendler did not stop in articulating the abovemen-
tioned test regarding "indications of business cooperation," and added
that a Regulation 482(a) agent is one whose "relationship with the de-
fendant has reached such a level of intensity that one may assume, as
a legal matter, that the agent will notify the defendant on the proceed-
ings initiated against him. ..".3 The Israeli Supreme Court further
added, that "the purpose of Regulation 482(a)... is mainly to assure
that the defendant is notified, of the proceedings initiated against him,
29 PCA 39/89 General Electric Corp. v. Migdal Insurance Ltd. [1989] IsrSC 42(4)
762; PCA 3652/94 Tendler v. Le Club Mediterranee (Israel) Inc. [1994].
30 Israeli case law has mentioned the following relevant indications of a business
cooperation: Does the agent conduct negotiations on behalf of the defendant? Does
the agent maintain operative connections with customers in Israel of the defen-
dant? Does the agent report to the defendant on the status of the market? Does
the agent have to obey the defendant's instructions? Is the agent presented to
third parties as representing the defendant? Do employees of the agent perceive
themselves to to be representing the defendant? See General Electric Corp., IsrSC
42(4) at 768-69. Is the agent's business title identical to that of the defendant? Do
they share a commercial brand name? Do the agent and the defendant advertise
their business together? Are the agent and the defendant parent and subsidiary?
Do the agent's board meetings take place at the defendant's offices abroad? Is the
agent authorized to issue receipts on behalf of the defendant? Does the agent oper-
ate exclusively for the defendant? Is the agent a branch of the defendant? What is
the subjective impression of a bystander? See Tendler, at 7.
31 See General Electric Corp., IsrSC 42(4) at 768; Tendler, at $ 6.
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by the one with whom the defendant maintains an ongoing commercial
relationship in the ordinary course of business...,3 These comments
certainly reflect the purpose of Regulation 482(a) to uphold due pro-
cess by notifying the defendant of the proceeding initiated against
him. However, these comments do not comport in any way whatsoever
with the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty.
In actuality, the act of serving with process has two completely
different functions. First, it upholds due process requirements by ena-
bling the defendant to defend himself against the claim filed by the
plaintiff. Thus, the defendant must be notified of the proceedings and
must be provided with an opportunity to submit his response to the
court. Second, and more importantly in the international jurisdiction
context, the act of serving the agent with process is meant to express
the exercise of international jurisdiction in accordance with the Princi-
ple of Territorial Sovereignty, rather than comporting with other theo-
ries of international jurisdiction, such as the Principle of
Effectiveness.
33
The Court's comments were thus unnecessary and redundant,
and perhaps even contradictory to the test of "indications of business
cooperation" that was articulated by the very same Court. Still, the
Court's seemingly redundant comments had practical implications.
First, practitioners repeatedly argue that Regulation 482(a) is not be-
ing applied uniformly.34 Second, and more importantly, certain bi-
zarre Regulation 482(a) agents were acknowledged as such by the
courts. For example, an Israeli customs clearance agent was acknowl-
edged as a Regulation 482(a) agent of a foreign defendant for whom
the customs clearance agent provided services,3 5 despite the fact that
one can hardly consider an outside provider of service to the defen-
dant, who was hired to supply a customs clearance service, as someone
whose business is so integral to that of the defendant to the extent that
it enables the foreign defendant himself to be regarded as being pre-
32 See Tendler, at 5.
33 Consider the meaning of this last proposition: if the Court had to interpret Reg-
ulation 482(a) according to the Principle of Effectiveness, the Court would no
doubt would have ruled that the correct test is whether or not the alleged agent is
one through whom the judgment rendered against the defendant would be enforce-
able. A judgment rendered against the defendant can be enforced via the agent in
cases in which the agent holds the defendant's property. For example, if an agent
owes money to the defendant or holds the defendant's property as a trustee or as a
fiduciary.
34 See, e.g., PCA 11822/05 Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Elroi [2006] 4 (publication
pending).
35 See VCP (TA) 3069/03 Merck Frosst Canada & Co. v. Birzeit Palestine Pharma-
ceutical Co. [2003] A(2).
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sent within the Israeli territory. 36 Similarly, an Israeli importer of ve-
hicles was determined to be a Regulation 482(a) agent of the foreign
vehicles manufacturer. 3 7 Under the Principle of Territorial Sover-
eignty, this decision is problematic because the business relationship
between the importer and the manufacturer does not undermine the
fact that each continues to maintain an independent legal and eco-
nomic unit that stands by itself, thus making it difficult to argue that
the foreign manufacturer is actually present within the Israeli
territory.38
This criticism of the Court's ruling could be put to rest by argu-
ing that, despite the internal contradiction in its ruling, the Court's
original intention was to examine the relationship between the foreign
defendant and the alleged business agent according to the standards
set by the "indications of business cooperation" test in a manner that
coincides with the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty.
39
Those so-called redundant comments made by the Court and
the practical implications that these comments carried with them ac-
tually reflect the correct positive position of Israeli law. Indeed, these
comments were not made fortuitously, but rather reflected the Court's
understanding that a broad interpretation of Regulation 482(a) is in
order. Indeed, under the JERDT, one needs to take an expanding ap-
proach with regard to the court's "ability" to exercise international
jurisdiction.4 °
If in fact the JERDT is the correct theory of international juris-
diction to be applied, then the supplementary and allegedly redundant
test placed by the Court in the General Electric Corp. and Tendler
cases, which focuses solely upon protecting the defendant's due process
rights, is the only correct and relevant test according to which Regula-
tion 482(a) should be interpreted. In other words, the JERDT in-
36 See Tendler, at 6 (stating that a salesperson with no other business coopera-
tion with the defendant is not to be regarded as a Regulation 482(a) agent).
37 See PCA 11556/05 Kamoor Vehicles Ltd. v. Heemo [20061 T 6 (publication
pending).
38 Of course, the dispute may nevertheless be adjudicated by the Israeli forum if
the court chooses to exercise jurisdiction by serving the defendant with process
abroad.
39 See Tendler, at 5 (stating that a test that seeks a level of business cooperation
that is more intense than mere ongoing business communication is too narrow and
does not coincide with the purpose of Regulation 482(a)).
40 See Tendler, at 4 ("I do not agree to a narrowing interpretation of Regulation
482(a). . . which does not comport with today's reality of a 'small world,' which
entertains close connections among countries and in which modern means of com-
munication allow the instantaneous and cheap transfer of information via the tele-
phone, the facsimile, and other electronic means, from almost any place on earth
to any place on earth. . ."); see also Kamoor Vehicles Ltd., T 6 (publication pending).
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structs the forum to reject the "indications of business cooperation"
test when contemplating its ability to assume jurisdiction within the
confines of Regulation 482(a). Interpreting Regulation 482(a) in a
manner that requires the plaintiff to merely prove that the defendant's
right of due process was protected maximizes the protection provided
for the plaintiffs right of access to court. Indeed, in a situation in
which the plaintiff need not show anything other than that the defen-
dant was appropriately notified of the proceeding, the court's doors are
opened before the plaintiff in the widest manner possible. The Israeli
courts' international jurisdiction would thus encompass any foreign
defendant who holds in Israel an appropriate address for service of
process. Such an address need not be examined technically, but
rather, should be examined in accordance with the law of service with
process that applies in domestic cases.
Such an expansive interpretation of Regulation 482(a), which
derives from the JERDT, does not derogate in any way from the defen-
dant's capability to argue that there exists a better forum in which the
parties can litigate the dispute. As previously mentioned, Regulation
482(a) concerns only the first step of the two-tiered test of interna-
tional jurisdiction: the "ability to assume jurisdiction" tier. 4 ' Thus, in
the JERDT terms, Regulation 482(a) need be interpreted solely in ac-
cordance with the plaintiffs right of access to court.
The second rationale dictated by the JERDT concerning the
protection of the process of optimizing the place of adjudication of the
dispute is to be accomplished within the second tier, which concerns
the "necessity" of exercising jurisdiction. Within the confines of the
second tier, the defendant may certainly raise such arguments as fo-
rum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens that would eventually result
in a refusal by the Israeli court to exercise international jursidiction.
IV. THE CASE OF FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE No ALTERNATIVE
FORUM
Although court decisions that exhibit the influence of the
JERDT are becoming more prevalent, this theory has not been for-
mally recognized by the Israeli Supreme Court. In fact, the Court's
case law seems to be moving back and forth between the new theory
and the problematic Principle of Territorial Sovereignty. While courts,
particularly of the lower levels, are formally obligated to the Principle
of Territorial Sovereignty as a guiding theory, judges having to decide
real cases that affect real people are intuitively drawn away from the
territorial theory and toward the two goals of the new theory.
41 See supra note 27.
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One context in which this phenomenon can perhaps be ob-
served is the context of exercising jurisdiction over claims filed by for-
eign plaintiffs who have no other forum but the Israeli forum in which
to litigate their dispute with the defendant.
A. The Eldermann Case
The Eldermann case required the Israeli Supreme Court to in-
terpret Section 136 of the Israeli Inheritance Law, which states that
an Israeli court can assume jurisdiction to adjudicate "the inheritance
of every person who at the time of his death was a resident of Israel or
owned property in Israel."4 2 The Supreme Court ruled that a claim
filed by an American Executor of an estate, who was appointed by an
American court in order to execute a certain will, against a defendant
resident in Israel, who according to the statement of claim unlawfully
withdrew money from a bank account of the deceased after her death,
does not fall within the meaning of Section 136.1 Therefore, the Court
ruled, Section 136 does not apply and consequently does not condition
the Israeli court's international jurisdiction over the defendant in this
case upon the deceased at the time of her death being domiciled in
Israel or having owned property in Israel.4 4 The Court held that the
claim was not an inheritance claim within the meaning of Section 136,
although the defendant had argued that his possession of the disputed
money emanates from a second will left by the deceased.4" In this sec-
ond will, the defendant argued, that the defendant himself was ap-
pointed as an executor of the estate, and the will stipulated that he
was entitled to forty percent of the assets. The defendant did not ar-
gue, however, that a court order to execute the second will was
issued.46
Instead of interpreting Section 136 in accordance with its pur-
pose, and within such a construction exposing the exact purpose upon
which courts ought to entertain jurisdiction in matters falling within
the scope of Section 136, the Supreme Court preferred to compare the
issue at hand to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction and to reach a
conclusion according to which "our answer to the question presented
can only be the one offered by us .... "4' The Court explained, inter
alia:
If our conclusion shall be that the claim at hand concerns
the deceased's inheritance, we shall be obliged to rule
42 Israeli Inheritance Law (1965).
43 CA 2846/03 Eldermann v. Eherlich [2004] IsrSC 59(3) 529, 536.
4 Id. at 539.
45 Id. at 532.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 533.
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that [Israeli] court lack international jurisdiction to ad-
judicate the claim ... In order to decide whether or not
the claim at hand concerns an inheritance claim one
needs to initiate a process of categorization and classifi-
cation. This is why we mentioned ... a hypothetical state
of affairs, in which the deceased herself files a claim such
as the one filed by the [estate executor]. The claim in
both lawsuits would be the same and the relief sought
would also be identical - i.e., monetary. The lesson to be
learned is that the mere fact that the claim at hand was
filed by an estate executor, who desires to obtain an as-
set (or be granted with restitution) from a third party,
does not necessarily turn the claim to one which concerns
matters of "inheritance." Had the claim been filed for a
relief in the form of a request for an inheritance order or
for probate, clearly one would have to conclude that the
claim concerns matters of "inheritance." However, the
case before us is not such a case. We can demonstrate
our point by taking notice of various cases litigated by
other courts in which a similar question arose.
48
Although the Supreme Court had trouble explaining in an or-
derly fashion the rationale engendering its conclusion, according to
which Section 136 does not apply to the claim filed by the estate execu-
tor, the new theory can supply a fairly reasonable explanation in its
stead. Section 136 could be interpreted as limiting the international
jurisdiction of Israeli courts to adjudicate matters of inheritance. On
the other hand, a narrow construction of Section 136 would expand the
international jurisdiction of Israeli courts, thus expanding the protec-
tion accorded to the estate executor's right of access to court.4 9 Indeed,
the interpretation given to Section 136 in the Eldermann case pre-
vents a situation in which plaintiffs, such as the American estate exec-
utor, are left without any relevant forum in which they can litigate
with the defendant (who according to their claim is unlawfully holding
property of the estate), to the extent that the defendant resides in
Israel and cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of any other foreign
court.
An inheritance, or probate, proceeding is an in rem proceed-
ing.50 To the extent that the estate executor attempts to collect prop-
erty of the estate, which is held by the executor himself or held by a
48 Id. at 536.
'9 The constitutional protection of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is
granted to "any person as such" (Section 2 of the Basic Law).
50 See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate
Execption to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1482 n.ll (2001).
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third party who does not dispute the ownership of the estate, it is suffi-
cient that the relevant property is located in the domicile country of
the deceased. However, the executor might experience some difficul-
ties in a situation in which not only the property of the estate is lo-
cated outside the country of domicile, but a third party holds the
property and is present in another country. As a result of the
Eldermann ruling, estate executors can now file a claim against these
third parties even if the deceased did not reside in Israel at the time of
death and did not own property in Israel. Indeed, in such cases, the
Israeli court would be able to exercise international jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with the Rule of Presence. Should estate executors such as
the American executor in the Eldermann case face a situation in which
they have no other relevant forum in which to litigate with the third
party, as likely happened in the Eldermann case, where the defendant
resided in Israel, and could not be subjected to the international juris-
diction of any other country, these plaintiffs would be able to litigate in
Israel, assuming that it is possible to serve the defendant with process
in Israel."'
Although focused upon protecting the plaintiffs right of access
to court, the Eldermann ruling does not derogate in any way from the
duty of Israeli courts to promote the optimization of the place in which
the dispute is to be adjudicated. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in
Eldermann, the defendant is certainly entitled to argue that, despite
the fact that Israeli courts can entertain jurisdiction of the claim,
Israel is a forum non conveniens, thus mandating that Israeli courts
refuse to actually exercise their jurisdiction.5 2 Of course, within the
confines of such an argument, the defendant can no longer evade the
litigation with the American estate executor. First, the defendant
must point to a relevant alternative forum (in which litigation will be
more convenient). Second, the defendant must prove that the alterna-
tive forum is in fact an effective forum in which litigation will indeed
commence and in which the defendant will not be able to raise further
obstacles in the face of litigation to the merits, such as a limitations
defense.
In order to understand the difference made by the new theory,
it is important to note that interpreting Section 136 in accordance with
the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty as the dominating theory of
international jurisdiction might have resulted in a different outcome
altogether. Indeed, in such a case, one could argue that the claim filed
by the American estate executor concerns an inheritance claim within
51 If the defendant in this case could be subjected to American jurisdiction, the
estate executor would file his claim in the United States. Obviously, a certain
state of affairs mandated that the claim be filed in Israel.
52 Eldermann, IsrSC 59(3), at 533.
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the meaning of Section 136. Such a construction would guarantee that
Israeli courts will litigate any dispute that concerns the estate only if,
at the time of death, the deceased resided in Israel or owned property
in Israel, thus promoting the territorial rationale. The Court ruled
that the case at hand is nothing short of a simple monetary claim, the
international jurisdiction of which could be obtained within the con-
fines of the Rule of Presence.5 3 But this conclusion can certainly be
doubted. As the Sabbag case demonstrates, courts tend to view legis-
lation that concerns international jurisdiction as exhausting, in a
manner rejecting the residual Rule of Presence.5 4 The Supreme Court
refrained from clarifying the purpose of Section 136, in accordance
with which the phrase "the inheritance of every person" ought to have
been construed. Furthermore, the Court failed to explain why one
should resort to the residual Rule of Presence as the relevant norm,
rather than referring to Section 136. 55 Moreover, one could argue that
the claim at hand concerns "the inheritance of every person" within
the meaning of Section 136, because the Inheritance Law itself applies
to such claims filed by estate executors against third parties 56 and be-
cause the real dispute between the American estate executor and the
defendant in the Eldermann case concerned which will should have
been executed.5 7
Construing Section 136 in accordance with the Principle of Ter-
ritorial Sovereignty might have resulted in a conclusion that the Is-
raeli legislature has limited the international jurisdiction of Israeli
courts, in cases such as the Eldermann case, only to situations where,
at the time of death, the deceased either resided in Israel or owned
property in Israel. On the other hand, construing Section 136 in accor-
dance with the JERDT, even under the assumption that Section 136 is
exhaustive, leads to the conclusion drawn by the Court: that Israeli
courts can exercise international jurisdiction to litigate the claim filed
by the American estate executor. According to this interpretation, the
Israeli legislature narrowed the international jurisdiction of Israeli
53 Id. at 539.
54 See infra Part III.B.
55 See Eldermann, IsrSC 59(3) at 535-36 (noting that the Rule of Presence is a
residual norm as it is only common law); HCJ 6751/04 Sabbag v. The Rabbinical
Court of Appeals [20041 IsrSC 59(4) 817 (focusing upon interpreting relevant legis-
lation concerning international jurisdiction rather than on examining the Rule of
Presence).
56 See Israeli Inheritance Law, 1965, §§ 82, 98.
57 See Eldermann, IsrSC 59(3) at 533. Of course, in such a case, the fact that the
defendant cannot point to a court order regarding the execution of the other will,
may serve to strengthen the plaintiffs argument. The absence of such a court or-
der does not undermine however the need to consider the dispute as one concern-
ing inheritance.
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  331 2008
332 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 7:3
courts in matters of inheritance, but did not take away the option of
estate executors to resort to the Rule of Presence in order to exhaust
the estate's entitlements against third parties who could not be forced
to litigate anywhere else but in Israel.
B. The Sabbag Case
As if to emphasize the lack of coherence disturbing the Israeli
law of international jurisdiction, which partly emanates from the fail-
ure to identify the JERDT's influence, the Israeli Supreme Court de-
cided yet another case of international jurisdiction on the very same
day on which the Eldermann judgment was rendered. This time, how-
ever, the Supreme Court blatantly adhered to the Principle of Territo-
rial Sovereignty.
The Sabbag case concerned the international jurisdiction of an
Israeli Rabbinical court to adjudicate a claim filed by a woman in order
to force her husband to provide her with a get.5" This couple, which
resided in Monaco, had separated from several years earlier and even
divorced in accordance with the laws of Monaco. Still, even seven
years after the civil divorce proceedings concluded, the husband kept
holding to his refusal to provide his wife with a get, despite the wife's
efforts to convince him to do so.5 9
Under Jewish law, the act of a Jewish religious divorce is
strictly a private one.6 ° Despite the religious context and possible per-
verse effects over the spouse and over third parties, such as children as
the result of a subsequent relationship between the wife and another
man,"' both the husband and the wife can actually refuse to get a di-
vorce.6 2 As a result, Jewish husbands can "anchor" their wives and
58 Sabbag, IsrSC 59(4) at 824.
59 Id. at 829.
60 See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS 58 (2001); AVIAD
HACOHEN, THE TEARS OF THE OPPRESSED - AN EXAMINATION OF THE AGUNAH PROB-
LEM: BACKGROUND AND HALAKHIC SOURCES vii-viii (2004).
61 Children produced by a union between an anchored woman and another man
are considered under Jewish law to be "illegitimate" - a status which carries sev-
eral severe implications, such as a prohibition agaisnt marrying anyone except
other illegitimate children. See, e.g., RACHEL BIALE, WOMEN AND JEWISH LAW: AN
EXPLORATION OF WOMEN'S ISSUES IN HALAKHIC 103 (New York, 1984).
62 Under Jewish law, the wife can also refuse to be extended with a get from her
husband, and thus she too cannot be compelled to execute a religious divorce
against her will. However, while chained wives cannot in any way enter into a
religious marriage with another man (or even carry an intimate relationship with
another man), Jewish husbands whose wives refuse to divorce them, even despite
an order issues by the court, can obtain a permission from religious authorities to
marry a second wife. See HACOHEN, supra note 60, at viii.
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chain them to the religious marriage,6 3 even if the parties divorce
under the relevant state law.64 On the other hand, as a result of the
immense discomfort that arose in the face of the human tragedy by
which many Jewish women were struck when their husbands refused
to release them from the religious marriage, known as the "plight of
the Agunah," the Rabbinical Court in Israel was equipped with certain
unique coercive measures that can be used to pressure a person to ex-
tend his consent to the get.6 5 Of course, the ability of chained wives to
apply to the Rabbinical Court to use its unique powers against chain-
ing husbands is dependent upon whether the Rabbinical Court can en-
tertain jurisdiction over the defendant-husband. Considering the fact
that many Jewish chained women worldwide, who are neither citizens
nor residents of Israel, would like to resort to the unique powers of the
Israeli Rabbinical courts for that purpose, as Rabbinical courts or
other authorities at their own place of residence cannot effectively as-
sist in unchaining them, the international jurisdiction of the Israeli
Rabbinical court becomes an issue.
63 These wives are called "Chained Wives" or, in Hebrew: "Agunot." See BIALE,
supra note 61, at 102-03.
64 Such anchoring often results in wives being chained for long periods of time or
husbands abusing the Ghet as a means of blackmailing their wives into giving up
their property and custody rights in exchange for the husband's consent to grant
the Ghet. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFER-
ENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 57-58 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001). For Jewish Is-
raeli chained wives, matters are made even worse, especially in terms of divorce
and subsequent results, where Israeli state law directly refers to the legal results
dictated by Jewish law. Section 1 of the Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction Law man-
dates that "matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, citizens of Israel or
residing in Israel, are to be adjudicated solely by the Rabbinical courts." See
Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction Law (Marriage and Divorce) 7 LSI 139, Section 1
(1953) (Isr.). Thus, Jewish Israeli chained wives cannot remarry even under state
law.
65 The Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law (Enforcing Divorce Decrees), 1995
specifies several such measures, to be used in cases in which the Rabbinical court
decides that the person, whether it is the husband or the wife, should divorce their
spouse, but that person refrains from abiding by the court's decree (to grant the
Ghet). Consider some of these measures: Section 2(a) empowers the court to stay
that person's exit from Israel; prevent that person from holding an Israeli pass-
port; prevent that person from holding a driver's license; prevent that person from
being nominated or elected to a public office; prevent that person from practicing a
regulated profession or operate a licenced business; prevent that person from hold-
ing a bank account or from withdrawing cheques from a bank account. Section
2(b)(2) empowers the court to foreclose that person's assets. Section 3(a)
authorises the court to have that person arrested, under certain conditions, for a
periods of time of up to ten years. See Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction Law (Enforc-
ing Divorce Decrees) 7 LSI 139, Section 2 (1995) (Isr.).
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In the Sabbag case, several attempts by both French and Is-
raeli Rabbis to influence the husband to unchain his wife, as well as
similar attempts made by several Israeli religious judges, all failed.6 6
The husband kept holding to his refusal to release his wife and an-
nounced that he did not acknowledge the authority of any religious
court whatsoever.6 7 Moreover, the Rabbinical courts of Lyon and Paris
declared their inability to adjudicate the dispute.6" In light of her se-
vere distress, the wife filed a claim in the Jerusalem Rabbinical Court
to force the husband to provide her with a get and to force him to pay
her maintenance.6 9 When the husband later came to Israel for a visit,
his wife immediately petitioned the Rabbinical Court, which in turn
issued an order preventing the husband from leaving Israel.7 ° The
husband retaliated by petitioning the High Court of Justice, demand-
ing that the detaining order be abrogated and that he be allowed to
leave Israel.7 1 Before deciding the case, the Justices of the High Court
of Justice suggested that the parties accept a compromise: that the
husband deposit a get with a trustee, following which the parties
would litigate their Jewish divorce before a Rabbinical court in France
and that court's ruling would bind them.7 2 However, the husband de-
clined to compromise and the High Court of Justice had no choice but
to decide the case.73 The husband's petition was granted and a major-
ity of the High Court of Justice ruled that the Israeli Rabbinical courts
do not entertain international jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims
filed by the wife."4
In its opinion, the majority explained that the Israeli legisla-
ture has limited the international jurisdiction of Israeli Rabbinical
courts as it stated, in Section 1 of the Rabbinical Court Adjudication
Law (Marriage and Divorce), 1953, that "matters of marriage and di-
66 HCJ 6751104 Sabbag v. The Rabbinical Court of Appeals [2004] IsrSC 59(4) 817,
841.
67 Id. at 841, 865 ("[T]he [husband] has already disclosed his opinion... according
to which there exists no forum whatsoever in which he wishes to litigate the di-
vorce, and although he said during court hearings in Israel that he would agree to
litigate in a French Rabbinical court, his past approach and the comments of these
courts speak for themselves.").
68 Id. at 842-43, 856. The exact reasoning behind this declaration remains un-
clear, as the High Court of Justice refrained from attempting to ascertain the rea-
son for the alleged "inability." However, at a minimum, the Court should have
clarified this point.
69 Id. at 824, 841.
70 Id. at 824.
71 Id.
72 Sabbag v. The Rabbinical Court of Appeals at 827, 842.
73 Id. at 827.
74 Id. at 839.
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vorce of Jews in Israel, citizens of Israel or residing in Israel, are to be
adjudicated solely by the Rabbinical courts."75 In this context, the Su-
preme Court noted that both the husband and the wife in the case at
hand were neither citizens of Israel nor residents thereof, thus leaving
the Rabbinical courts in Israel without jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 1.76 The majority went on to examine whether the Israeli
Rabbinical courts may assume international jurisdiction by force of
Section 4 of the Rabbinical Court Adjudication Law, which states that
"where a Jewish wife sues her Jewish husband or his estate for main-
tenance in a Rabbinical court otherwise than in connection with di-
vorce, the plea of the defendant that a Rabbinical court has no
jurisdiction in the matter shall not be heard."7 7 Although it has long
been held that Section 4 does not mandate the existence of the terms of
jurisdiction dictated by Section 1, the section discussing Israeli citizen-
ship or residency,7" the majority in the Sabbag case nevertheless de-
cided that the wife's maintenance claim against the husband did not
fall within the scope of Section 4 because "it is not truly a maintenance
claim otherwise than in connection with divorce but rather a mainte-
nance claim in certain connection with divorce and actually in-
separably dependent upon the divorce."7 9 The majority also held that
the main purpose of Section 4 is to serve as a source of jurisdiction for
Rabbinical courts to adjudicate maintenance claims filed by women
within the confines of a marriage.8 0
The majority also stated that "one should not view the mainte-
nance claim as an independent claim. . . in the circumstances of this
case the maintenance claim was not filed in an honest and sincere
manner, but was meant to overcome the obstacle of the Rabbinical
court's lack of jurisdiction, and find a loophole that would enable to
subject the husband to the Rabbinical court's jurisdiction to adjudicate
the divorce claim, thus allowing the divorce and get issues to be re-
solved."8 ' Such an insincere claim did not merit, according to the ma-
jority, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rabbinical Court nor did it
merit the issuing of any coercion measures upon the husband while
preventing him from going back home.8 2 The majority concluded with
the following statement:
75 Id. at 829-30.
76 Id. at 831.
77 Rabbinical Court Adjudication Law (Marriage and Divorce) § 4 (1953); Sabbag,
IsrSC 59(4) at 832.
78 Sabbag v. Rabbinical Court of Appeals at 832 (citing relevant cases).
79 Id. at 833, 834.
80 Id. at 833.
81 Id. at 834, 836.
82 Justice Elyakim Rubinstein dissented. In his dissent, the Justice opined that
the maintenance claim filed by the wife should be considered a claim for enlarged
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This proceeding raises several significant questions
which concern the appropriate ways to solve the phe-
nomenon of get refusals among Jewish communities
worldwide. The pertinent question that arises is what
are the jurisdictional limits of Israeli Rabbinical courts
to adjudicate such disputes and utilize its arsenal of co-
ercion measures upon foreign spouses who have no con-
nection to Israel, whether in the context of get refusal or
in other contexts; What are the jurisdictional limits of
Israeli Rabbinical courts with regard to Jewish commu-
nities abroad?
These jurisdictional questions are difficult and complex
from various aspects. In connection with get refusal they
raise the question of how the need to change prevailing
jurisdictional rules of Israeli Rabbinical courts relate to
the ability and capability of developing the Jewish law
regarding get refusals in order to supply Jewish adjudi-
cation authorities abroad with sufficient coercion
measure.
As of now, it is impossible to tackle the phenomenon of
get refusals between Jewish spouses having no connec-
tion to Israel by subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the
Israeli Rabbinical court ......
The Sabbag ruling is problematic. s4 Had this case been de-
cided according to the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty, the conclu-
maintenance, because she is prevented from remarrying, as this term is construed
by the Halakha (the collective corpus of Jewish law). In such a case, the Justice
continued, Section 4 applies and the Rabbinical court can exercise jurisdiction in
this case. See id. at 834 (Rubinstein, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 837 (majority opinion).
84 The Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction Law (Marriage and Divorce) 7 LSI 139
(1953) (Isr.) was amended in 2005 to include provisions (Sections 4A, 4B and 4C)
that grant Israeli courts with international jurisdiction in divorce cases, even if
either: (1) the defendant alone is domiciled in Israel; (2) both parties are citizens of
Israel; (3) the plaintiff was domiciled in Israel in the year preceding the claim and
she resided in Israel for at least a year prior to filing the claim; (4) the plaintiff is
domiciled in Israel and the spouse's last common domicile was in Israel; (5) the
plaintiff is both a citizen of Israel and domiciled in Israel; (6) the plaintiff is an
Israeli citizen and resided in Israel for year during the two years preceding the
claim; (7) the parties are Jews married in accordance with Jewish law, divorced
according to the secular law of a foreign country, the plaintiff is an Israeli citizen,
and the claim is only for a Jewish divorce; or (8) the parties are Jews married in
accordance with Jewish law, the plaintiff is an Israeli citizen staying in Israel at
the time in which the claim is filed, and at that time divorce of any kind is impossi-
ble in the county in which the parties were lastly domiciled. Of course, even under
the terms of this new regime, the chained wife in the Sabbag case would have been
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sion of the majority would have been correct. In such a case, the
Principle of Territorial Sovereignty would be used to construe Section
4 and, while the Israeli legislature would still be entitled to reject the
Principle of Territorial Sovereignty, it would be required to do so in a
clear manner.8 5 To the extent that Section 4 reflects an intention to
overcome the jurisdictional limit set by the Principle of Territorial Sov-
ereignty, the wording of Section 4 indicates that the Israeli legislature
granted the Israeli Rabbinical courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate a
claim for maintenance filed by Jewish women otherwise than in con-
nection with divorce. However, construing the wording of Section 4 in
accordance with the theory of Territorial Sovereignty reveals that the
Israeli legislature did not specifically grant similar extra-territorial ju-
risdiction with regard to get claims. Thus, under the theory of Territo-
rial Sovereignty and given that the actual dispute with her husband
concerned the issue of the get, Section 4 cannot be read as enabling the
Rabbinical court to adjudicate the wife's claims.
On the other hand, inasmuch as the dominating theory of in-
ternational jurisdiction is the JERDT, one cannot escape the conclu-
sion that the majority in the Sabbag case, with all due respect, erred
in its interpretation of Section 4. From an Israeli point of view, the
parties litigating in the case at hand are foreigners. So is the dispute
that was brought by the plaintiff before the Israeli court. This dispute
had nothing to do with Israel and the plaintiffs behavior was blatant
forum shopping. One could therefore argue that it is inappropriate for
Israeli courts to adjudicate such a dispute. However, the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty protects the constitutional rights of for-
eigners as well.8" Thus, even foreigners enjoy a constitutional right of
access to court. Assuming that the wording of Section 4 can uphold an
interpretation according to which Section 4 applies to the wife's claim
for maintenance," the real question posed by the JERDT is how to
limit the Israeli Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the wife's
claim, considering the wife's constitutional right of access to court. In
this context, one can hardly disagree that the real dispute with her
husband concerns the get. Indeed, the majority in the Sabbag case
left without a remedy. It seems that the only cure for her would have been to apply
for Israeli citizenship or change her place of residency.
85 See HCJ 279/51 Amsterdam v. Minister of Finance [1952] IsrSC 6 945, 971.
86 The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty speaks of "a person" or "any per-
son." Section 2 states that "[tihere shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity
of any person as such." Section 3 states that "[tihere shall be no violation of the
property of a person." Section 4 states that "[aill persons are entitled to protection
of their life, body and dignity."
s7 As already mentioned, in Justice Rubinstein's dissent, he agreed that the word-
ing of Section 4 does uphold such an interpretation. See Sabbag, IsrSC 59(4) at
860 (Rubinstein, J., dissenting).
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clearly acknowledged it. 8 8 However, identifying the real dispute
should have been used to tilt the decision in favor of the wife, and not
to her detriment. Indeed, contrary to the insinuations made by the
majority in the Sabbag case, the distinct conclusion arising from this
case concerns the fact that the wife did not have any other forum in
the whole wide world in which she could effectively litigate the get
dispute with her husband. Inasmuch as the phenomenon of foreign
plaintiffs attempting to litigate a dispute in Israel is the subject mat-
ter, one need differentiate between a situation in which the plaintiff
does so because she seeks a relief that can be granted by an Israeli
court but cannot be granted elsewhere (a classic situation of forum
shopping), and a situation in which the petition to the Israeli court
emanates from the fact that the defendant is doing everything he can
to evade the litigation, and does so by arguing against the interna-
tional jurisdiction of any possible court.8 9 In the Sabbag case, the mat-
ter at hand did not concern only the relief to be granted to the wife,
and the various measures of coercion that can be exercised by the
Rabbinical courts in Israel, but first and foremost the very issue of
litigating the get dispute with the husband. In this context, not only
had the husband announced that he does not acknowledge the author-
ity of any religious court whatsoever, but the Rabbinical courts of Lyon
and Paris declared their inability to adjudicate the dispute. 90 Thus,
the Court should have at least inquired whether or not the wife has an
alternative effective forum in which to litigate the get dispute with her
husband, even if such an alternative forum could not provide her with
the same relief that Israeli Rabbinical courts can issue. The majority
refrained from doing so, and instead settled on commenting that "the
problem of Chained Jewish women who are citizens and residents of
foreign countries, and who have no significant connection to Israel,
might find a solution, even if partial, within the confines of the local
law in the parties' place of residence."9 1
88 HCJ 6751/04 Sabbag v. The Rabbinical Court of Appeals [2004] IsrSC 59(4),
817, 834.
89 Justice Rubinstein referred to the opinion of Dr. Michael Vigoda, the head of
the Hebrew Law Department at the Ministry of Justice, who opined that Israeli
private international law acknowledges the expnasion of jurisdiction to the extent
that the plaintiff does not have any other forum to which he can apply. See id. at
858 (citing CA 3868/95 Verber v. Verber [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 817, 846-47; HCJ 297/
77 Chen v. The District Rabbinical Court [1979] IsrSC 31(3) 678, 679.90 Id. at 842.
91 Id. at 835.
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V. CONCLUSION
Something is wrong with the Israeli law of international juris-
diction. The Sabbag judgment brought with it sad news for Jewish
Chained wives who are not citizens or residents of Israel and whose
husbands refuse to provide them with a get. The Sabbag ruling has
also left a somewhat bitter taste of justice not being done. However, a
critical examination of another judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court,
which was actually rendered on the very same day the Sabbag judg-
ment was issued, would have revealed a striking character of the Is-
raeli law of international jurisdiction: the absence of a clear choice of a
guiding rationale that could prompt consistent case law. The current
article thus attempted to speak in favor of an effort to make such a
choice.
The article also attempted to introduce a new theory of interna-
tional jurisdiction, which could also enrich the possibilities facing Is-
raeli lawmakers in the future as they come to make the above
mentioned choice. The new theory-the JERDT-seems to already be in-
fluencing, at least to some degree, Israeli case law-as was demon-
strated in the in context of serving with process to a business
agent-and thus becomes a serious competitor to the traditional theo-
ries of international jurisdiction, especially to the infamous Principle
of Territorial Sovereignty.
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